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PRODUCTS LIABILITY SYMPOSIUM
THE STATE OF THE ART DEFENSE IN
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
On first examination, the doctrine of strict products liability in
tort as enunciated by section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts' appears to be a simple solution to the problems which an
injured consumer had to surmount under negligence law in order
to recover from the seller of a defective product for injuries caused
by that defect. Ostensibly, since liability will attach even though
the seller has exercised all reasonable care, negligence concepts
such as foreseeability and reasonableness should have no applica-
tion. As a matter of fact, however, such concepts do play a very
important part in the application of this doctrine and, as will be
seen, it is for that reason that state of the art evidence may play
an important part in the defense of a strict products liability law-
suit.
II. THE STATE OF THE ART DEFENSE
A. In Negligence Cases
Before examining the meaning and utility of the state of the art
defense in strict liability cases, it is helpful to consider its usage in
negligence cases. Under negligence law, the state of the art defense
is especially effective because it establishes a standard of care
which the manufacturer is only required to meet, not exceed. A
case which is often cited 2 to demonstrate the importance of the
state of the art defense in negligence cases is Day v. Barber-
Colman Co. 3 In that case the plaintiff was installing an overhead
sliding door when the door fell down on top of him causing his
injuries. The plaintiff sued the defendant manufacturer and alleged
that it negligently failed to install a stopping device to prevent the
door from closing during installation before the counterweights
were attached. The court emphasized the defendant's state of the
art evidence which indicated that the door was made according to
a standardized design, in common use in the industry at the time,
and stated:
I. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. Bridgman, Defective Design in Strict Tort Liability, PRACTICAL DEFENSE PROBLEMS,
1972 Defense Research Institute Monograph No. 9; Karasik, "State of the Art or Science":
Is it a Defense to Products Liability?, 60 ILL. B.J. 348, 350 (1972).
3. 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956).
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[I]t is not of itself negligence to use a particular design or method
in the manufacture or handling of a product. . . which is reason-
ably safe and in customary use in the industry, although other
possible designs . . . might be conceived which would be safer
4
In view of such evidence, the court held:
[T]he state of the art of the time and the prior history of the use
of the product would not have indicated or required any material
change in design or manufacture.5
Similarly in Schneider v. Chrysler Motor Corp.,' the court
stated in response to the plaintiff's allegation of negligent product
design:
A manufacturer is not an insurer and cannot be held to a stan-
dard of duty of guarding against all possible types of accidents
and injuries. Standards of design and manufacturing skill must
be consonant with the state of the art . .. .7
Another more recent case involving the use of state of the art
evidence in defense to a claim of negligent design is Olson v. Arctic
Enterprises, Inc.8 The plaintiff in that case was injured when his
foot became caught in the track of a snowmobile, manufactured
by the defendant, on which the plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff
alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to install a pas-
senger grip, failing to install adequate passenger footrests, and
failing to adequately cover the track and sprocket mechanism. The
defendant showed through the use of literature and specifications
distributed by the manufacturers of competing snowmobiles, that
no snowmobile sold at the time the injury-producing snowmobile
was sold, incorporated any of the plaintiff's suggested modifica-
tions. The court held for the defendant on the negligent design
claim and stated:
None of this "state of the art" testimony was rebutted by the
plaintiff, nor did he carry his burden of bringing forth affirmative
evidence of the defendant's failure to consider the safety aspect
of design.9
4. Id. at 508, 135 N.E.2d at 238.
5. Id. at 507, 135 N.E.2d at 237.
6. 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968).
7. Id. at 557.
8. 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972).
9. Id. at 765.
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Thus it appears that in a negligent design case, once the defen-
dant comes forth with evidence showing his compliance with the
state of the art, he has established a prima facie defense and the
plaintiff then has the burden of proving either non-compliance in
fact, or that the state of the art standard is a negligent one."0
B. In Strict Liability Cases
1. Definition
While in negligence cases the state of the art defense refers
primarily to the common or standard practices in the particular
industry involved, the term seems to have a somewhat broader
meaning in strict liability cases, encompassing two separate, albeit
closely related, types of evidence.
The first type of state of the art evidence is that of the industry-
wide standards to which the defendant has conformed. This is
similar to the state of the art evidence employed in negligence cases
and is intended to demonstrate that the defendant's product con-
forms with the products of other manufacturers. A recent example
of an urisuccessful attempt by a defendant to utilize this type of the
state of the art evidence is Gelsumino v. E. W. Bliss Co.," a case
in which the plaintiff, a punch press operator, was injured when his
foot slipped onto a floor pedal control which activated the punch
while his hand was under it. The defendant attempted to introduce
evidence of the fact that the design of the foot pedal was similar
to that used by other manufacturers, but the court held that such
evidence was irrelevant and stated:
[D]efendants in the instant case (cannot) avoid the issue of strict
liability by attempting to show merely that they had done what
the rest of their industry had done to make their products safe.'
10. See: March Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 219, 240
N.W. 392, 396 (1932), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court held:
The fact that the custom of manufacturers generally was followed is evidence of
due care, but it does not establish its exercise as a matter of law. Obviously, a
manufacturer cannot, by concurring in a careless or dangerous method of manufac-
ture, establish their own standard of care.
Similarly in The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932), Judge Learned Hand stated:
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is common prudence; but strictly it is
never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It may never set its own tests, however persuasive its usages.
Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that
even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.
11. 10 I11. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973).
12. Id. at 609, 295 N.E.2d at 113.
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The second type of state of the art evidence is that which is
offered to show that the product cannot, within the current limits
of scientific knowledge, be made more safe. An illustrative case is
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 3 where the plaintiff, who
had undergone surgery involving the unsuccessful implantation of
a bone transplant product manufactured by the defendant, con-
tended that the product was unreasonably dangerous in that it
involved a fifteen percent failure rate. The court held for the defen-
dant however, emphasizing defendant's evidence that "Squibb had
developed its process to the highest degree attainable by it at the
time. . ..."" In using this type of state of the art evidence, the
emphasis is not on what other manufacturers are doing, but rather
on the fact that everything that is technically possible is being done
to make the product safe.
It is important to note that a manufacturer can never plead that
his product fell short of the state of the art, in either sense of the
term, because he was unaware of the standards adhered to by his
competitors in the industry or because he was ignorant of the
technical advances in the field. This is so because:
[A] manufacturer is held to the knowledge and skill of experts
... .This standard imposes the duty to keep abreast and in-
formed of the developments in his field, including safety devices
and equipment used in his industry with the type of products he
manufactures. 5
2. Uses of the State of the Art Defense in Strict Liability Cases
The term "state of the art defense" is actually somewhat of a
misnomer in strict products liability cases because, unlike in negli-
gence cases, the mere fact that the defendant establishes that he
has conformed with the state of the art does not constitute a prima
facie defense to strict liability. This is because under section 402A,
the manufacturer or seller can be liable even though he "has exer-
13. 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1973). Although this case dealt with breach of implied warranty
of merchantability rather than strict liability, there is a considerable amount of overlap
between the two theories, making them:
identical in substance, differing principally in the degree to which the strict liability
theory ignores such traditional Code limitations as privity of contract, disclaimers,
and notice requirements. Bernstein, Evidence of Producer's Due Care in a Products
Liability Action, 25 VAND. L. REv. 513, 514 (1972).
14. 274 So. 2d at 901.
15. Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 I11. App. 2d 133, 145, 237 N.E.2d 759, 765




cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.""
Therefore, as a technical defense, state of the art evidence used to
establish a standard of care is irrelevant. This was demonstrated
in Gelsumino v. E. W. Bliss Co.,17 an Illinois decision, where the
defendant attempted to introduce evidence of his compliance with
industry-wide standard designs as a defense to the plaintiffs claim
of defective design in strict liability. The court stated:
Plaintiff questions whether defendants actually showed conform-
ity to the state of the art, but we do not resolve that issue since
we find that the "state of the art" defense is irrelevant with
respect to the two strict liability counts ....
• . . Conformity to the state of the art is not a defense to a claim
involving an unreasonably dangerous product. 8
This result seems inescapable in light of section 402A's man-
date, but the fact that compliance with the state of the art is not a
defense in itself should not wholly diminish the utility of state of
the art evidence in other aspects of the defendant's case. Such
evidenc6 has been used, with varying degrees of success, for two
principal purposes: (1) to show that a product is not defective, and
(2) to show that a product is unavoidably unsafe and within the
exception to strict liability delineated by comment k to section
402A. 19
(a) To Show that the Product is not Defective
One of the basic elements which every plaintiff must establish
in order to make out a prima facie case of strict products liability
(or any kind of products liability) is the existence of a defect in the
product which was, if not the sole cause, at least a contributing
cause of his injury.2" A product is defective if it is unsafe for normal
handling and consumption, in light of the directions and warnings
accompanying the product.2' Whether a product is defective is
usually analyzed in terms of the reasonable expectations of the
consumer or user.2 1 Since many products, such as knives or
matches, may be incapable of being made perfectly safe, this re-
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
17. 10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1956).
18. Id. at 609, 295 N.E.2d at 113.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k at 353-54 (1965).
20. Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Products Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV. 325
(1971).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h at 351-52 (1965).
22. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 I11. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
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quirement serves to prevent the imposition of liability in cases
where a user is injured even though the product was performing as
expected by both the manufacturer and the user. According to the
Restatement, in order to impose strict liability:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordiiary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics.2
Since whether or not a product is defective depends upon whether
or not the danger involved in its use would be apparent to a reason-
able consumer, state of the art evidence can be useful in establish-
ing that the product involved is similar to all other products of that
type and that therefore "an ordinary consumer. . . with the ordi-
nary knowledge common to the community as to its characteris-
tics"24 would have realized the potential danger.
An example is the case of Jackson v. Biloxi,25 where the five
year old plaintiff kicked over a kerosene warning lamp manufac-
tured by the defendant, and was burned when some of the kerosene
splashed on his leg. In rejecting plaintiff's claim of strict liability
based on improper product design, the court placed great emphasis
on the evidence that the design was "an old and apparently ac-
cepted means of handling a warning situation,' 2 6 and stated,
"defective condition means that the article has something wrong
with it, that it did not function as expected. '27
Similarly in Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc.,28 the plaintiff
claimed that his injury resulted from a design defect in a snowmo-
bile manufactured by the defendant. The court examined the state
of the art evidence produced by the defendant in the form of speci-
fications and promotional information of other manufacturers'
snowmobiles and held:
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i at 352-53 (1965). Similarly
in Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 342, 247 N.E.2d 401, 403
(1969), the court stated:
Although the definitions of the term "defect" in the context of products liability law
use varying language, all of them rest upon the common premise that those products
are defective which are dangerous because they fail to perform in the manner reason-
ably to be expected in light of their nature and intended function.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 402A, comment i at 352 (1965).
25. 272 So. 2d 654 (Miss. 1973).
26. Id. at 656.
27. Id.
28. 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972).
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To refuse to consider the "state of the art" as it relates to the
operational aspects of a snowmobile would be to hold the manu-
facturer liable for merely marketing a functionable product-in
effect placing absolute liability upon such manufacturer. 9
Unquestionably the product was capable of causing harm, but that
fact alone did not render it defective. Since the machine repre-
sented the highest degree of safety attainable at the time, as evi-
denced by other manufacturers' products, while still being func-
tional, it was not defective because it didn't present a danger which
would not be anticipated by a reasonable consumer.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney0 is yet another example.
Although the defendant's bone transplant product had experienced
a fifteen percent failure rate in the past, it was not defective be-
cause the failure rate of other similar products was at least equally
high.
(b) To Show that the Product was "Unavoidably Unsafe" within
the Meaning of section 402A, comment k.
According to section 402A, comment k:31
There are some products which in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their in-
tended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the
field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the
Pasteur treatment of rabies. . . . Such a product, properly pre-
pared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not
defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. . . . It is also true
in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical
experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even
of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies
the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognized risk. The seller of such products. . . is not to be held
to strict liability for unfortunate consequences . . . merely be-
cause he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but appar-
ently reasonable risk.31
Putting aside the question of proper warning for the moment,
it seems that whether or not a product will fall within this section
29. Id. at 764-65.
30. 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1973).




is dependent on two factors: (1) whether or not the risk is unavoida-
ble under the "present state of human knowledge," and (2) whether
the utility of the product justifies its exception from strict liability.
With respect to the first factor, it should be remembered that
the manufacturer is held to the knowledge of an expert33 and
therefore is required to be aware of the state of the art. Such
evidence in this context is absolutely essential and will generally be
of the type intended to demonstrate that the product cannot be
made more safe in light of current scientific knowledge (although
evidence of what other manufacturers are doing might well be
relevant to that determination).
The "unavoidably unsafe" exception has found its greatest ap-
plication in the drug field. In Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,34 for
example, the plaintiff had undergone extended treatment with the
drugs Aralen and Triquin for a skin disease. Both were manufac-
tured by the defendant and both contained chloroquine. Plaintiff
eventually went blind, and expert testimony at trial identified the
condition as chloroquine retinopathy, a reaction to the chloroquine
in the drugs. The court held that comment k was clearly applicable
and stated that the exception covered products, especially drugs,
because:
[C]onsumers for a long time have lived with and accepted the
risks inherent in their use ....
The reason for relaxing strict liability. . . is because "(s)uffi-
cient user experience is indispensable to research, and making the
supplier a guarantor of safety without such research may be
regarded as too burdensome"."
Another case, not involving drugs, which demonstrates the
importance of the two factors mentioned above with respect to
comment k is Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.6 The
plaintiff in that case, an industrial insulation worker, had been
exposed to asbestos dust for 36 years. He developed asbestosis, had
a lung removed, and eventually died as a result of such exposure.
In the case against the asbestos manufacture, the court took note
of the fact that the asbestos dust could not be avoided in the
manufacture of asbestos insulation and then stated:
33. Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 IlI. App. 2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759 (1968).
34. 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 292 A.2d
206 (1971).
35. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1969).
36. CCH Prod. Liability R. 1 7017 (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 1973).
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"[U]navoidably unsafe products" are those which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are incapable of being made safe for
their ordinary and intended use. Strict liability may not always
be appropriate in such cases because of the important benefits
derived from the use of the product. This is especially so with
respect to new drugs that are essential in treating disease but
involve a high degree of risk. It may be so with respect to other
commercial products possessing both unparalleled utility and
unquestioned danger. As a practical matter, the decision to mar-
ket such a product requires a balancing of the products utility
against its known or foreseeable danger."
If a manufacturer intends to rely on the "unavoidably unsafe"
exception carved out by comment k, he will have no choice but to
implement evidence demonstrating that the state of the art has not
progressed to the point where the risk is no longer unavoidable.
Likewise, since it must also be shown that the utility of the product
justifies its exception from strict liability, the manufacturer may
also wish to demonstrate that the state of the art is not such that
the need for the product is obviated, i.e. that the product's benefits
cannot be achieved in some other manner.
3. Warning
(a) In General
According to section 402A comment j, the seller or manufac-
turer may be required to give a warning as to the risks involved in
the use of the product, to prevent it from being unreasonably dan-
gerous. As stated in comment h, such duty exists when the manu-
37. Id. at 12,214. A case which seems to fly in the face of the two-pronged test for the
application of comment k (unavoidably unsafe and unquestioned utility) is Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970), where the plaintiff
contracted serum hepatitis due to a transfusion of blood from defendant hospital. The
defendant argued that since there was no possible method of detecting impure blood, and
since the need for the blood was unquestionable, comment k's exception should apply. The
court stated however:
We believe it clear that the exception set forth in the quoted Comment [(k)] relates
only to products which are not impure and which, even if properly prepared, inher-
ently involve substantial risk of injury to the user. Such exception cannot avail where,
as here, the product is alleged to be impure. Id. at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
Although this inherently dangerous-impure distinction has been employed in other cases,
such as Community Blood Bank v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967) and Cochran v.
Brooke, 243 Ore. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966), it is certainly an insignificant distinction. If the
product is needed and the user is made aware of the risks involved, then technical niceties
as to the exact nature of the risk involved should not be determinative of whether the seller
will be held liable. The policy is the same in both cases. See Note, Strict Liability for
Diseases Contracted from Blood Transfusions, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 80 (1971).
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facturer or seller "has reason to anticipate that danger may result
from particular use. ' 38 As stated by the court in Oakes v. Geigy
Agricultural Chemicals:
A manufacturer or supplier of a product must give warning of
any dangerous propensity of an article produced or sold by him
in the product or in its use of which he knows or should know,
and which the user of the product would not ordinarily dis-
cover.
3 9
It appears therefore, that the duty to warn depends upon the fore-
seeability of the use to which the product is put.
(b) In Regard to Unavoidably Unsafe Products
Comment k provides an exception from strict liability for una-
voidably unsafe products only if they are accompanied by a proper
warning. As noted above, the duty to warn depends on what is
foreseeable-clearly a negligence concept. As stated by the court
in Basko,40 "Comment k simply adopts the ordinary negligence
concept of duty to warn." By the very nature of the products likely
to fall within the "unavoidably unsafe" exception however, the
duty to warn becomes especially important. Because the product
is dangerous and because of the often unknown propensities in-
volved, the manufacturer not only has a duty to warn in the first
instance, when the product is sold, but he also has a continuing
duty to warn of newly discovered dangers involved in the product's
use.4" Also, because of the technical nature of some of the products
involved, such as prescription drugs, the warning will often be
directed to a third person, such as a doctor or pharmacist.12
The warning must be such as to impress upon the user the
actual magnitude of the risk involved, and once again, the manu-
facturer must not engage in practices designed to nullify its effect.
An example here is Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 3 where defen-
dant drug manufacturer's labels contained adequate warnings as to
possible dangerous effects of prolonged use, but the court held that
liability could nonetheless be imposed because the vigorous promo-
tion of the drug by defendant's detailmen was such as to erode the
warning by encouraging prescribing doctors to ignore it."
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h at 351-52 (1965).
39. 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, _... 77 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1969).
40. 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969).
41. Davis v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968).
42. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 2d 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
43. 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973).
44. See also Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 2d 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
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In summary, the question of when a warning must be given and
whether one given is adequate involves a balancing test. As the
court stated in Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.," after rejecting
a purely statistical approach to the problem (i.e., judging the need
for a warning by the size of the population likely to be adversely
affected):
When in a particular situation, the risk qualitatively (e.g., of
death or major disability) as well as quantitatively, on balance
with the end sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a true
choice judgment . . . the warning must be given.46
III. CONCLUSION
There appear to be three primary reasons for imposing strict
tort liability on a manufacturer or seller of products. First, it is said
that the consumer is entitled to rely on the product being what it
purports to be, and not a dangerous instrumentality.17 Second, the
imposition of such liability will serve as a deterrent against the sale
of other defective products and as an inducement to improve the
safety of the product.4 8 Third, imposing such loss on the manufac-
turer allows him to pass it on to his other customers and thus, the
loss is effectively distributed throughout society.49
With regard to the product whose risks cannot be eliminated
and which is accompanied by a proper warning, only the third of
these reasons has any validity. If the consumer is warned of the
dangers involved in the use of the product, then he cannot reasona-
bly expect the product not to involve a risk. If a product cannot
possibly be made more safe, then any attempt at deterrence or
inducement is misdirected. Therefore the question becomes
whether a product is of enough value to society so that when a
manufacturer sells it with a proper warning, he should not be held
liable. However, since under the distribution of loss theory the
manufacturer will have to pass the cost of such liability on to his
customers, who will pass it on to the consumers, the real question
becomes how much society is willing to pay for the product. As
45. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
46. Id. at 129-30. Accord Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., CCH Prod. Liabil-
ity R. 7017 (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 1973), where the court held:
[A] duty to warn attaches whenever a reasonable man would want to be informed
of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it.
47. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1123 (1960).
48. Brody v. Overlook Hospital, 121 N.J. Super. 2d 991, 296 A.2d 668 (1972).




the cost of a product rises, a consumer must decide if he really
needs the product. If he doesn't, sales will decline and the manufac-
turer might be forced to stop producing the product. If the product
is essential, then the consumer will pay irrespective of costs.
On first glance, this "natural selection" approach might seem
to be an appropriate means of ridding the market of unsafe prod-
ucts. If the consumer will bear the cost of liability for the unsafe
product, then the product should remain available. The problem,
however, is that the type of product which is likely to fall under
the title of "unavoidably unsafe" is not a product which is used by
a large percentage of the population. Drugs and other medical and
pharmaceutical products may be used by a relatively small seg-
ment of the consuming public and therefore when the cost of liabil-
ity is passed on, it will be especially hard to bear. Yet if the product
is really necessary, as many drugs are, the individual may have no
choice but to pay. Thus the exception to strict liability provided in
comment k10 is well justified. State of the art evidence is indispensi-
ble in bringing this important exception into play because without
it, the product cannot be shown to be "unavoidably unsafe."
JAMES T. MURRAY, JR.
STRICT LIABILITY AND THE
SCIENTIFICALLY UNKNOWABLE RISK
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment deals with the question of whether or not a
manufacturer should be excused from liability in a "strict liability"
case because the injury resulted from a danger that was a scientifi-
cally unknowable risk prior to the injury. Basically, this question
is concerned with defining the outer limits of the concept of "defec-
tive" products and, thereby, the scope of the strict liability theory
in products liability cases.' The black letter rule of section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability on sellers
or manufacturers if their product is in a "defective condition un-
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k at 353-54 (1965).
1. 2 L. FRUMER AND M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A(4)(3), p. 3-332.
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